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Executive Summary 
Storing spent nuclear fuel is a complex issue.  Generation of spent nuclear fuel from 
power plants throughout the United States has created a need for storing this which remains 
radioactive for thousands of years.  Interim storage, a necessary step toward achieving this safe 
storage goal, presents a number of social, economic, and political challenges.  The considerations 
that must be addressed when dealing with interim storage are the costs associated with storing 
spent fuel, determining who should be responsible for carrying these costs, understanding how 
safe the storage options are, ensuring that the spent fuel is safe from potential terrorist attacks, 
how the public’s concerns are heard and addressed, where the waste is ultimately stored (i.e., on-
site or off-site in regional facilities), and whether management of spent nuclear fuel should 
involve reprocessing.  Our goal was to investigate how people from different backgrounds feel 
about interim storage of spent nuclear.   
We focused on these considerations because our research indicated that they raise the 
greatest amount of concerns among members of the public, government as well as power plant 
managers and their employees.  The background chapter discusses issues such as the spent fuel 
problem, management of spent nuclear fuel, fuel pools, and most importantly dry cask interim 
storage of spent nuclear fuel.      
We investigated the concerns that we found to be most important by identifying members 
from different groups and interviewing them on how they felt about each of these issues.  The 
groups that we focused on were members of the government, members of interest groups, and 
members of the general public.  We spoke with two members of the public, four members of 
interest groups, three members of the government, and two plant representatives. We asked these 
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individuals’ questions about how they felt about particular issues concerning interim storage of 
nuclear waste that would help answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the types of concerns that people have with interim storage of nuclear waste?   
2. Do people feel that interim storage does an adequate job of containing radiation and is 
it secure from terrorist attacks?  
3. Is the public represented properly in the current system of dry cask licensing?  
4. Do different kinds of people express different ideas about the relative benefits and 
risks of interim storage?   
 
Our analyses lead to several findings: 
1. The ability of dry casks to store waste safely does not seem to be a pressing issue in any 
of the groups we interviewed.   
2. Interviewees expressed concerns about the party responsible for paying for dry cask 
storage.  
3. Most interviewees also expressed financial concerns about the potential longevity of 
companies that maintain dry cask units, compared to the longevity of the dry casks.  
Therefore we can conclude that cost is an issue that people of various backgrounds are 
concerned with.   
4.   The necessary level of security was an issue of disagreement to the individuals  
interviewed.  Some individuals call for dry cask storage to increase security of spent fuel 
stored in fuel pools.  Some individuals call for hardened on-site storage to increase the 
security of dry cask units to acceptable levels.   
5. The interviewee’s views on the level of public involvement were varied.   
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6. The individuals identifying themselves as members of interest groups were among the 
least positive supporters of interim storage. 
7. The only issue considered unanimously among individuals identifying themselves as 
members of the government was safety.   
8. The members of the general public that were interviewed in this report felt that the public 
was properly represented in the ISFSI licensing process. 
9. The plant representatives were most concerned with finding a long term solution to the 
waste storage issue. 
10. The individuals involved in the Maine Yankee CAP were among the most positive 
supporters of dry cask storage. 
11. The reprocessing of nuclear waste is an issue of debate that should not be linked to dry 
cask storage of nuclear waste. 
12. The number of onsite interim storage locations should not affect the ability of regulators 
to carry out proper cask inspections, because of the USNRC inspection standards that are 
in place.  
13. The equitability of interim storage of nuclear waste at regional facilities is questionable.  
 
Our findings led to several recommendations of two types:  policy recommendations and 
research recommendations. 
 Policy Recommendations: 
1. The federal government should consider creating a new tax on power generated from 
nuclear reactors that will go toward an account that will fund interim storage of nuclear 
waste. 
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2. The federal government should, if they have not already, formulate a plan of action for 
the scenario of an ISFSI owner bankruptcy. 
3. The federal government should create definite standards for nuclear waste storage 
security. 
Research Recommendations: 
1. The federal government should investigate the success of the Maine Yankee Community 
Advisory Panel in order to determine the usefulness of such groups in helping plant 
operators to communicate with the public during the decommissioning process. 
2. A more detailed study of regional storage options should be completed. 
4. A further study should investigate how members of the public from various locations feel 
they are represented in the ISFSI licensing process. 
5. A further study should interview more plant representatives in order to determine their 
thoughts on dry cask storage for an interim time frame. 
This report considered the social issues associated with interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. 
It identified which issues were most important and validated these issues. Interim storage issues 
are important to consider because spent nuclear fuel is a long lasting material, and currently has 
no final resting place. The issues involved with storing spent nuclear fuel until a final solution 
can be found, must be resolved in order to avoid problems, like fuel pools filled to levels that are 
not secure. At the same time, we must continue to consider the things that are important to us. 
Rushing to solve this problem is not the solution, we must work together to find out which 
solutions are the safest, most secure, most cost effective, and most fair. 
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Abstract 
 
Storage of spent nuclear fuel is a topic that raises many concerns. Without a permanent 
repository, a number of options for interim solutions have been proposed or implemented. This 
project combined interview and archival data to understand the range of people’s concerns about 
interim storage for managing a growing stockpile of spent nuclear fuel. Our findings and 
recommendations address issues of safety, cost, security, and how concerns about them are 
expressed by different types of stakeholders. 
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1 Introduction 
In November of 1942, nuclear power emerged in the US when the Chicago Pile-1 power 
plant began operating at the University of Chicago under military guidance (US DOE, 2008). 
The first commercial power plant providing electricity to civilians was opened on December 20, 
1951, and is known as the Breeder Reactor-1 in Idaho.  Since then, the commercial nuclear 
power industry has expanded to 104 operational power plants located throughout the United 
States. At the moment nuclear power accounts for a large part, approximately 20%, of the 
electrical energy production in the United States (Holt, 2003).  No new commercial reactors have 
been built since May, 1996 (Moens, 2005).  A major factor that has stunted the growth of this 
industry is the inability to find a suitable plan for nuclear waste storage in the United States 
(Macfarlane, 2006).  With increasing attention given to the future role of nuclear power as an 
energy source in the United States the importance of this issue is unlikely to diminish in policy 
debates (Smith, 2006). 
Nuclear waste is defined as many different kinds of radioactive waste which are 
categorized by levels and types of radiation.  Each of these types of waste can be a threat to 
human and environmental health.  One type, spent nuclear fuel, has the highest hazard rating of 
nuclear wastes (CRS Report to Congress, 2006).  When a nuclear reactor operates, it uses nuclear 
fuel which undergoes a fission reaction in order to create energy to generate electricity.  This 
happens until the fuel can no longer produce energy because of fission reaction’s by-products 
that accumulate inside the material.  At this point the nuclear fuel is referred to as “spent nuclear 
fuel.”  The fission by-products contained inside the spent nuclear fuel emit radiation until they 
are stable. Spent nuclear fuel is very hazardous and requires careful handling in order to ensure 
that the environment, nearby citizens, and the handlers are not exposed to unhealthy levels of 
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radiation. The waste must first be stored for 40-50 years in a fuel pool to cool, before it can be 
handled.  Approximately 53,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel has been produced from nuclear 
power plants across the United States at a rate of 2,700 metric each year (USDOE, 2006). 
Reaching a stable state can take up to thousands of years (NSNFP, 2008).  Thus, the 
management of spent fuel is probably the most important issue to address concerning the overall 
management of nuclear waste. 
Nuclear waste storage is a controversial issue because of the complexity of the storage 
process.  There are many areas of concern that have been raised by nuclear consultants and 
experts, communities surrounding power plants, and members of interest groups.  The problems 
associated with nuclear waste storage range from social and economic to environmental 
problems. A number of different options have been proposed for nuclear waste storage.   
Since 1988 the US government has been attempting to develop a geologic repository 
located at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.  It is very controversial and unclear if it will ever be 
licensed (Wells, 2006).  There are several technical and social issues associated with the plan for 
Yucca Mountain.  For example, how does water move above and below the repository at Yucca 
Mountain?  How might radioactive elements released from degraded waste move away from the 
repository (YuccaMountain.org, 2008)?  To date, there have been six lawsuits filed against 
Yucca Mountain.  One major lawsuit makes the argument that Yucca Mountain violates the U.S. 
constitution, and that 49 states cannot gang up on one state to solve their problems by burdening 
Nevada with storage of these hazardous wastes (Nevada, 2003).  In addition, news reports have 
come out in the past stating that some data in the Yucca Mountain project have been falsified 
(New York Times, 2005), which is relevant to the performance of computer models on water 
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infiltration and climate, which are two major factors in determining the safety of Yucca 
Mountain as a repository.  
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the creation of a central geologic repository for 
spent nuclear fuel, options for interim storage are being proposed.  Interim storage is a temporary 
storage of nuclear waste either on or off site of nuclear power plants.  Temporary can be defined 
as a time frame from ten, twenty, or even up to a hundred years.  Exploration of interim storage 
methods will serve as an important framework for the future of safely storing nuclear waste in 
the United States until a more permanent repository such as Yucca Mountain is licensed.  Major 
issues of debate concerning interim storage of nuclear waste include cost, security and safety.  
Each of these metrics must be weighed appropriately when considering the different options for 
interim storage plans.  We also investigated two other issues related to interim storage of nuclear 
waste which include: public representation and reprocessing. 
Currently, there are two methods of interim storage for storing spent fuel: dry and wet 
storage.  Wet storage involves storing the waste in underground fuel pools.  Dry storage typically 
involves placing the waste in large ceramic casks (Helland, 2001).  A number of concerns have 
been raised about these options.  Safety and security concerns about fuel pools are that spent fuel 
is more vulnerable to terrorist attacks and runs a higher risk of combusting if overheated (Kamps, 
2004).  The cost of maintaining fuel in fuel pools is higher long-term because it is necessary to 
constantly maintain a circulating water source to both cool the fuel and act as a shield against 
radiation (Bunn, 2001). Despite the drawbacks associated with fuel pools, they cannot be 
eliminated entirely, as they are necessary to cool the spent fuel down before it can be placed in a 
cask for storage (NAS, 2005). Moreover, dry casks are extremely expensive to construct, and as 
a result many facilities are not willing to make the transition from using fuel pools to casks. 
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In addition to the type of storage, the geographic location of the storage sites is yet 
another decision that has been debated.  For example, nuclear waste can either be stored on site 
or off site of nuclear power plants.  If nuclear waste is stored off site, then transportation of 
hazardous waste is another issue. Cost of transporting nuclear waste is much higher, and there 
are many potential hazards that could result in transport (NAS, 2007).  
There are several gaps in information about interim storage of nuclear waste that are 
important to understand for policymakers, interest groups, and communities that live around 
nuclear waste storage sites.  Identifying these gaps will provide clarity for these groups when 
assessing the current state of nuclear waste storage in the United States.  First, while many 
studies compare dry cask and fuel pool storage, none systematically present information about 
people’s concerns.  Most reports are either factual descriptions about interim storage methods or 
policymaking documents that went into detail about licensing, regulations, and statistical 
comparisons.  For example, the NRC gives detailed reports on the different stages of the 
licensing process, as well as explaining what fuel pools and dry casks are from a technical 
standpoint (USNRC, 2008).  Second, out of all the different issues such as cost, safety, etc. 
discussed, no prior studies have investigated which issues were the most important and to whom.  
For example, cost may be of more importance to legislative policymakers whereas safety is most 
important to the communities where the waste will be stored. Third, we wanted to find out 
whether the public was being properly represented by the current legislative and regulatory 
framework regarding nuclear waste storage.  Lastly, we wanted to research the topic of regional 
storage and equity.  We define this by asking the question, should the waste be at the place where 
the energy was produced or should it be sent to communities that never benefited from the 
nuclear power, and should waste be stored off site at regional locations?   
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Our project was designed to help better understand all of these issues. We investigated 
the concerns regarding interim nuclear waste storage of several categories of people.  We 
interviewed eleven people and qualitatively analyzed their responses to our questions.  The 
categories of people we researched were: members of the general public, members of interest 
groups, government representatives, and plant representatives.  We also explored which of the 
concerns (e.g., cost, safety, security, etc.) is most important and why to each of the interviewees.   
In addition, in order to better our understanding of the regional storage and equity situation we 
researched proposed private fuel storage on an Indian reservation in Utah, where nuclear waste 
from all over the country would be transported and stored.  Utah currently does not have its own 
nuclear power plant, and this issue of equity was of interest to us.  The main focus of our project 
was to investigate nuclear waste storage as a separate issue than nuclear power.  We wanted to 
ensure that our research followed this objective. 
We found that safety was not an issue of debate among the individuals interviewed. On 
the other hand, cost was an issue of debate; from a standpoint of which party should pay for 
interim storage and who would be responsible for bankruptcies of interim storage facility 
owners.  We also found that security was an issue of debate; particularly in the levels that were 
necessary.  Finally, we found that public representation was an issue to consider; because 
individuals around some plants seemed to be better represented than individuals around other 
plants. 
In the remainder of this report we will first provide a general background to nuclear 
waste storage in the United States.  We will present information on current methods of storage, 
and plans for future such as the geologic repository Yucca Mountain.  Then we will discuss 
methods of our research which will include a specific set of research questions, and how we 
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answered them.  Our report will conclude by presenting our results and findings, along with a set 
of recommendations for both policy makers and for future research. 
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2 Background 
This chapter provides an overview on important issues concerning interim storage.  The 
purpose of the background chapter is to provide information that will help the reader understand 
the social problems regarding nuclear waste, and its context.  In the first section we present 
information about the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel and the major risks that are associated 
with the waste.  Then, in section two we address the two methods of storing spent nuclear fuel as 
well as describe the promised geological repository at Yucca Mountain.  In section three we 
introduce two specific proposals for interim storage, Hardened on Site Storage (HOSS) and 
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs).  Section three also describes the method 
for acquiring a license for ISFSIs, as well as comparing two cask storage locations, Maine 
Yankee and Diablo Canyon.  Two regional storage options, NORMS and Private Fuel Storage, 
and reprocessing are among other important interim storage strategies discussed in the section.  
Section four details the technology of dry cask storage, where we pay close attention to specific 
concerns such as cost, safety, security, public representation and reprocessing. 
I. The Spent Fuel Problem 
 Spent nuclear fuel is the byproduct of a nuclear reaction using uranium. Spent nuclear 
fuel is developed after certain isotopes of elements have undergone a fission reaction.  Only 
certain isotopes of elements such as uranium, plutonium, or thorium can undergo this type of 
reaction (McCarthy, 1995).  The most commonly used element in nuclear power reactors today is 
uranium (WNA, 2007).  Two major forms of uranium exist naturally in the environment today, 
as a mixture of U-235 and U-238, with an abundance of 0.7% and 99.3% respectively (USNRC, 
2008). U-235 is the isotope that is mainly used in fission reactions since the other isotope is not 
as effective (McCarthy, 1995).  The amount of time the nuclear fission reaction takes depends on 
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the amount of U-235 in the rod and the speed at which the reaction is taking place (speed is 
regulated by graphite rods).  According to Birk (2004), “uranium is being used up and fission by-
products accumulate and interfere with efficiency until the fuel can no longer effectively produce 
energy.”  At this point the amount of byproducts (which are not fissionable) becomes so great 
relative to the amount of uranium-235 that the fuel rod is useless for power production and is 
replaced (Birk, 2004). This rod is no longer useful as fuel and is considered spent nuclear fuel.  
With every chemical reaction, there are unwanted byproducts that develop, but in the case of a 
nuclear fission reaction the byproducts include highly radioactive isotopes with very long half 
lives.  Therefore, the spent nuclear fuel produced from a nuclear fission reaction is dangerous to 
humans for very long periods of time.  A list of some of these radioactive isotopes (byproducts) 
is shown below in Table 1.  The type of radiation emitted by these materials is alpha, beta or 
gamma modes and there is a very large span of half lives.  This concept the type of radiation is 
explained later in this chapter.   
 
Table 1.  List of Radioactive Isotopes in Spent Nuclear Fuel (Source: CCNR, 1996) 
Isotope Name Half Life Type of Radiation 
Thorium-232 14 billion years Alpha 
Iodine-129 15.7 million years Beta and Gamma 
Americium-141 400 years Alpha 
Cesium-137 30 years Beta and gamma 
Radon-222 4 days Alpha 
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A. Quantity of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
 A large reactor produces about 27,000 kilograms or 27 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel 
per year. There are 104 active nuclear reactors in the United States, which means that this 
country produces about 2,700 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel each year. Approximately 53,000 
metric tons of spent nuclear fuel has been generated by nuclear power plants across the United 
States since nuclear energy was first introduced as a major form of energy production (DOE, 
2006).  The amount of spent nuclear fuel produced each year continues to grow.  This is due to 
nuclear power plants increasing amount of overall energy production, which will lead to more 
production of spent nuclear fuel.  By 2010 the amount of commercial spent nuclear fuel is 
expected to exceed 63,000 metric tons.  If proposals for increasing US reliance on nuclear power 
are followed, the amounts may be considerably higher (Smith, 2006). 
 
B. The Risks Associated with Spent Nuclear Fuel 
  Spent nuclear fuel is very hazardous and requires careful handling in order to ensure 
that the environment and the handlers are not exposed to unhealthy levels of radiation. The 
hazard of the material comes from its tendency to decay radioactively, releasing alpha, beta, and 
gamma radiation. These types of radiation are called ionizing radiation because they can often 
change the structure of a molecule in their path (most often they take an electron from an atom in 
their path and make that atom charged (Bertell, 1986). According to Bertell (1986) this 
ionization results in a “sudden influx of random energy” and “may either [cause] cell death or 
cell alteration.”  
   While beta and gamma radiation also are emitted from spent fuel, the radiation of 
spent fuel is predominantly made up of alpha particles. Because spent nuclear fuel primarily 
emits alpha particles, the likelihood of exposure is not as high as most people believe.  Alpha 
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particles are the largest radioactive particle and travel at the slowest speed (relative to gamma 
and beta particles) which makes it very difficult for them to penetrate human skin and therefore 
is usually harmless.  These particles travel very small distances in air and can be stopped by a 
single sheet of paper. The only way in which alpha particles may be harmful to the human body 
is if they are first ingested or inhaled.  Therefore, with minor precautions, the risk of harmful 
exposure can be prevented (Kose, 2008).  A list of radioactive isotopes contained in spent 
nuclear fuel is shown in Table 1 earlier in this chapter. 
 While containing the radiation given off from spent fuel is very important, cooling the 
spent fuel is equally (if not more) important.  If spent fuel is not transported to fuel pools to be 
cooled, or if the fuel pools are not monitored carefully, the fuel could overheat and create a fire 
that could possibly be more devastating than a nuclear meltdown (Nuclear Information and 
Resource Services, 2008).  If the zirconium cladding used in fuel rods is exposed to air or steam, 
it will react exothermically and create a fire that would reach a temperature of about 1,000 
degrees Celsius (NAS, 2005).  A fire of this magnitude could rage on for days.   
 The effects of radiation from the fuel itself catching fire could cause even more damage 
than the fire (NIRS, 2008).  In fact, according to NIRS (Nuclear Information Resource Service): 
“A single spent fuel pond holds more cesium-137 than was deposited by all atmospheric nuclear 
weapons tests in the Northern Hemisphere combined.”  Exposure to cesium-137 (Cs-137) can 
cause burns, acute radiation sickness, and death (CDC, 2005).  In addition, there is an increased 
risk for cancer because of high-energy gamma radiation.  Therefore, it is imperative that spent 
fuel be cooled and isolated from any substance which it may react with to ensure that such a 
catastrophe does not occur. 
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 The management of this radioactive waste requires much attention due to the potential 
environmental and health effects that can result from spent nuclear fuel.  Spent nuclear fuel must 
be contained in such a way that the public and the environment can be protected.  Therefore, the 
dangers associated with spent fuel must be well known and taken into consideration during the 
transportation of spent fuel and the construction of storage sites. 
 
II. Current Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
 This section will discuss the current management of spent nuclear fuel which includes 
both interim storage as well as information on the possibility of a permanent repository Yucca 
Mountain. 
 
A. Spent Fuel Pools 
Fuel pools are typically 40 to 50 feet long by 23 to 26 feet wide by 40 to 43 feet deep 
(Society for Industrial Microbiology, 2008).  These pools are surrounded by a steel plated 
reinforced concrete wall that is five feet thick (Zhang, 2004). Such pools typically have 20 feet 
of water above them which serves as a shield that stops radiation emitted from the spent fuel 
from getting into the environment.  The water is typically kept below 100 degrees Fahrenheit, 
which is a sufficient temperature for cooling spent nuclear fuel (Spent Fuel Pools Newsgroups, 
2008).  A picture of a spent fuel pool can be seen below in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Spent Fuel Pool (source: Wikimedia.org) 
A nuclear reactor cycles out part of its core as spent nuclear fuel every one to two years. 
One year’s spent nuclear fuel produced from a reactor is between 20 and 30 metric tons (Zhang, 
2008).  After 15 to 30 years of spent nuclear fuel storage, the spent fuel pool reaches capacity 
and the cooled spent fuel in the pool must be moved out to make room for new additional waste 
(Zhang, 2008).  
Cooled waste constitutes any waste that has been cooled for one year in a spent fuel pool. 
At this point the waste is ready to be moved out of the pool to a dry cask storage container 
(DOE, 1989). Currently, spent nuclear fuel is only removed from a spent fuel pool when a pool 
reaches its capacity. However, sometimes the spent nuclear fuel is moved to another spent fuel 
pool (DOE, 1989). 
Spent fuel pools are specifically designed to be large enough to store SNF without 
compromising the cooling process and safety of the pool. This cooling process relies on the 
circulation of water surrounding the spent nuclear fuel (Nevada Project Office, 1999), which is 
monitored constantly to ensure that it does not stop. A stoppage in circulation could lead to 
overheating of the fuel pool, resulting in release of radioactive material into the atmosphere 
because of extreme fires, as described above (Nuclear Information and Resource Services, 2008).  
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The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission states (2002), “A catastrophic meltdown in the spent 
fuel pool of a nuclear power plant could cause fatal, radiation-induced cancer in thousands of 
people as far as 500 miles from the site, according to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
study (Journal News, 2002).”   
Fuel pools are located close to the reactor to minimize the distance of transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel (Citizens and Scientists for Environmental Solutions, 2001).  The spent fuel 
pools are located below ground level, in Fuel Handling Buildings.  This below ground storage 
minimizes the environmental risks of leaks, which would result from wall damage to an above 
ground pool (the water in the pool cannot escape quickly because the pool is surrounded by rock) 
(Citizens and Scientists for Environmental Solutions, 2001).  
 
B. Dry Casks 
Dry cask storage is another method of storing spent nuclear fuel, which must always 
follow the initial cooling process of the fuel pools. According to the BRWM (Board on 
Radioactive Waste Management), dry cask storage systems have the same objectives as fuel pool 
storage: cool the fuel, shield from radiation, and prevent critical accidents (BRWM, 2006).  
Traditional dry cask storage is a way of storing nuclear waste in a dry form without using water 
or mechanical systems.  The size of dry casks range from 18-20 feet in height and can weigh 
over 300,000 pounds when fully loaded (Indian Point Energy Center Brochure, 2008).  The 
internal structure of the cask is designed with a fixed geometry in the shape of a basket (BRWM, 
2006).  This type of fixed structure inside the cask, with individual compartments, contains the 
fuel in an orderly fashion.  A passive cooling system is used by inserting an inert gas inside the 
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casks; most often this gas is helium.  In order to shield the public from radiation, dry casks are 
usually made of steel, lead, or concrete and are at least 18 inches thick (Helland, 2001, p. 2). 
These thick walls also help to block gamma rays.  After being loaded with the nuclear 
waste, the outside walls may reach temperatures up to 100
 o
C.  Inside the cask, the waste is 
placed in rods either horizontally or vertically on pads.  The material the cask is made of, the size 
of the cask, and the gaseous internal composition all help protect from radiation leakage.  In 
addition, the casks are designed to withstand natural disasters including tornadoes, floods, or 
extreme temperature changes (USNRC, 2007, p. 3).  No mechanical or electrical components are 
needed to go along with the casks.  A picture of this type of storage can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Dry Cask (source: thinkquest.org) 
This type of storage began when the NRC first licensed the Surry Nuclear Power Plant at 
Virginia in 1986.  The decreasing capacity of fuel pools to store waste has greatly influenced 
nuclear power plants to turn toward storing spent nuclear fuel via dry casks.  Most dry cask 
storage sites are situated on the east coast of the United States, or in the mid-west near the Great 
Lakes region (Current and Potential Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, 2005).   A 
map of the current dry cask sites is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Map of dry cask sites (source: USNRC, 2007) 
 
C. Yucca Mountain Geologic Repository 
Much of the spent nuclear fuel residing in spent fuel pools and dry casks was planned to 
be moved to a central geologic storage facility at Yucca Mountain, located 100 miles northwest 
of Las Vegas.  Many nuclear power plants have depended on disposing of waste at Yucca 
Mountain.  The Yucca Mountain central repository is planned to have a capacity of 70,000 
metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, and there is already 53,000 metric tons of waste in the United 
States (USDOE, 2006). With 104 reactors open in the U.S., creating 20 to 30 metric tons of 
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waste per year, the repository at Yucca Mountain would reach full capacity by 2036 if opened in 
2010 (Nevada, 2003).   
The Yucca Mountain repository was originally scheduled to begin accepting spent 
nuclear fuel in January of 1998.  However, multiple setbacks have occurred at the site which has 
caused the scheduled opening of the site to be pushed back to at least 2017 (United States Senate, 
2006). These setbacks include: resistance from the state of Nevada, falsified reports about water 
infiltration and climate, and opposition to spent nuclear fuel transportation (Corbin, 2007). Until 
Yucca Mountain is opened, cooled spent nuclear fuel will need to be kept in spent fuel pools or 
moved from fuel pools to dry cask storage units.  Although the government has promised for a 
permanent disposal and storage option for nuclear waste, currently no off-site nuclear storage 
locations or central repositories exist. 
Opening a geologic repository in one central location will also involve transport of 
radioactive materials, and this venture is costly.  Almost 5 billion dollars in funds have accrued 
since the construction of Yucca Mountain (Science, 2006).  These funds were collected by the 
federal government from the nuclear power plants producing SNF.  The government has 
allocated this money for the management and transportation of SNF to Yucca Mountain.  Many 
nuclear power plants have since brought the federal government to account for failure to comply 
with past deadlines regarding SNF disposal (Science, 2006).  However, resulting from the 
Energy Act of 2005, the United States government has given nuclear power plants tax credits and 
subsidized funds in the order of 150 billion over the next 50 years (CRS, 2007). 
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D. Summary 
Many risks result when using nuclear power.  Harming the environment and causing life 
threatening health risks to humans is a significant concern to the public.  An equally pressing 
issue is the concern that we may run out of room at fuel pools altogether within the next few 
years.  A spokesman from Entergy, the parent company of Indian Point says: “The pools are not 
vulnerable- we’re just running out of room, period.”  Estimates suggest that these fuel pools will 
have reached capacity by 2015 (Energy Resources International).  The American Nuclear 
Society says that if this problem is not addressed before plants reach their maximum storage 
capacity, they would have no choice but to close down plants which have exceeded the 
maximum levels of their fuel pools. In order to accommodate these power plants, and due to the 
lack of success in the Yucca mountain project, an interim storage strategy using dry casks is 
necessary.   
 
III. Interim Storage using Dry Casks 
The purpose of this section is to first provide information on Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installations (ISFSIs) of dry cask storage.  It will discuss the different types of licensing 
of different types of dry casks and the process of registration with the USNRC, among other 
information about regulations on about ISFSIs of dry casks.  In addition, this section will 
conclude by presenting information about various different forms of interim storage waste 
methods involving dry casks.  These include hardened on site storage (HOSS) and regional 
storage options. 
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A. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 
Permission from the USNRC must be obtained before beginning construction of a dry 
cask storage unit. There are two types of licenses issued for dry cask storage unit construction: 
site specific license and the general license. General licensed dry cask storage units exist at 30 
locations in the United States, site specific licensed dry cask storage units exist at 15 locations in 
the United States (USNRC, 2007). Both license types are described below in detail, and a map of 
all licensed ISFSIs is presented earlier in Figure 3. 
A site specific license application starts with a proposal of a design of the dry cask unit, 
called an ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), which is reviewed by the USNRC 
for technical and safety issues (USNRC, 2007). Once the USNRC approved the ISFSI design, 
more analysis of the ISFSI is completed in an Environmental Assessment (EA) and a Finding of 
No Significant Impact (FONSI), which assess the safety of the geographical location of the 
ISFSI (USNRC, May 2007). These reports are published together and are open to public review. 
At this time, the public is issued a Notice of Availability for public comments, and is given an 
address to mail concerns to (USNRC, May 2007). If no geological problems with the land or 
technical problems with the casks are found in the five to six months following the release of the 
EA and FONSI, the dry cask proposal is licensed by the NRC and construction can begin 
(USNRC, May 2007). This site-specific license allows nuclear waste to be stored in the dry cask 
unit to be built at that site and is good for 20 years, after which it must be renewed again 
(USNRC, 2007).  
A general license is the request to build a dry cask storage unit for which specifications 
have already been approved by the USNRC.  This licensing occurs in a much smaller amount of 
time, because the design specs do not have to be re-reviewed. General license applicants must 
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provide adequate evidence that the site will be safe; evidence includes an emergency plan, a 
quality assurance control plan, a security program, a radiation protection program, and an 
employee training program (USNRC, February 2007). This process takes about 22 months, and 
once completed, the licensee performs a dry run, and if all goes well, the cask may be loaded 
(USNRC, February 13, 2007). General licensing allows nuclear waste to be stored in the dry cask 
unit for a period of time decided by the USNRC; this period of time may not exceed 40 years 
(USNRC, 2008). 
There are several types of casks, which is mainly dependent on licensing.  Casks can be 
identified as single, dual or multi-purpose (BRWM, 2006). The single-purpose cask is only 
licensed to store spent fuel (BRWM, 2006).  Dual-purpose casks can either be used for storage or 
transportation.  Multi-purpose casks can be used for storage, transportation, or disposal in a 
central repository such as Yucca Mountain.  One decommissioned power plant that has utilized 
the dual purpose design is Rancho Seco; a decommissioned nuclear power plant in California.  In 
2002, 493 fuel assemblies were placed into dual purpose casks and stored on site at Seco’s ISFSI 
(U.S. NRC Decommissioning, 2003). 
Another way that dry casks are distinguished is whether they are bare-fuel based or 
canister-based (BRWM, 2006).  This type of classification indicates what method was used to 
load the spent fuel into the casks.  In bare-fuel casks, the spent fuel is placed into a basket which 
is a part of the cask.  The cask is also sealed with a bolted lid.  In canister-based casks, the spent 
fuel is loaded into baskets which are surrounded by a thin steel wall.  The basket is sealed with a 
lid, and then the canister can be placed in a dry cask container which is also sealed with another 
lid (BRWM, 2006).   
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The process for sealing the canisters starts with workers loading the cask at the fuel pool.  
The loading of the spent nuclear fuel assemblies into storage tanks takes place under water 
within the fuel pool (NRC, 2005).  The water in the fuel pool acts as a shielding layer so that 
workers can safely transfer the fuel assemblies into a stainless steel canister (NRC, 2005).  The 
canister is submerged in the fuel pool and the fuel assemblies are loaded.  Once the metal 
canister is removed from the fuel pool it is then welded shut (NRC, 2005).  This technique for 
canister closure welding is an automated process, which means a machine welds the container to 
minimize workers exposure to radiation (Westinghouse, 2008).  Once welded, the canisters are 
then placed inside a larger concrete container (referred to as a cask) which holds the steel tank 
(Virtual Nuclear, 2008).  After the tank is placed in the concrete cask it can be transferred to the 
ISFSI loading pad.   
 
B. Hardened On-Site Storage (HOSS) Option 
Hardened storage is a form of nuclear waste storage which is intended to be safer and 
more secure than traditional interim storage options (Thompson, 2003).  While dry casks are 
very secure and robust, and can absorb large impacts without rupturing, they may not be capable 
of withstanding a determined, concentrated attack.  These casks may be hardened by surrounding 
them with layers of concrete, steel, gravel and other materials which make them even more 
durable (Thompson, 2003).  Hardened storage casks are more likely to withstand a highly 
focused attack such as an anti-tank missile (Thompson, 2003).  Some strong proponents of 
HOSS feel that they are a better and safer means of storing spent nuclear fuel than Yucca 
Mountain (NEIS, 2006). 
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C. Regional Storage Options 
This section will discuss two types of regional storage options: NORMS (Nearby or on 
site retrieval monitored storage) and PFS or private fuel storage.  These are ways of storage 
using dry casks which may provide alternatives to a geologic repository or strictly on site 
storage. 
NORMS is a plan that would use dry casks in regional storage facilities in order to keep 
the waste as safe and secure as possible for the ecosystem which it is located.  Some of the 
principles that NORMS tries to achieve are designing the safest casks that emit minimal 
radiation, security and monitoring of the storage site.  The difference between HOSS and 
NORMS is that HOSS deals with adding more physical protection of dry casks, and NORMS 
deals with geographic locations of where the storage sites should be located.   
NORMS principles recognize power plants to be responsible for fund clean ups, and 
disclose any and all information about decision making to the people immediately surrounding 
the interim storage location.  The NORMS principles act as a code of ethics that power plants 
should abide by to manage a successful interim storage location (NORMS, 2000).      
 A second approach to regional storage referred to as PFS or private fuel storage was 
approved by the USNRC to take effect in Skull Valley, Utah (Private Fuel Storage, 2008).  The 
central idea of PFS involved nuclear waste dry casks from all over the country to be transported 
to Utah for storage. Utah expressed great resentment towards this decision to use the state as a 
nationwide interim storage ground (Healthy Environment Alliance of Utah, 2006).  Although this 
plan is now dead, during the licensing process for this plan, Utah representatives stated 
widespread objection to interim storage of nuclear waste.  We wanted to find out whether Utah 
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representatives were rejecting dry cask storage or were they rejecting the public policy decision 
to use Utah as a storage state.  
An alternative option to having one centralized repository or regional storage location 
would be to have regional storage facilities scattered throughout the nation following NORMS 
guidelines of safety procedures, etc.  Richard Lester, an MIT professor, believes the central 
repository at Yucca Mountain to be unobtainable and unrealistic.  Lester, a nuclear power 
specialist, feels that it will be far too difficult to store and treat SNF at a central repository.  
Lester states that “the (Bush) administration should focus on finding regional storage facilities 
for the nuclear waste,” rather than encouraging nuclear energy and reprocessing, which he feels 
only adds to the problem of spent nuclear fuel (Science, 2006). 
 
D. Summary 
There is much controversy as to which form of interim storage is better suited for the 
United States: dry cask or fuel pools.  Experts such as the USNRC (2007), state that dry casks 
are very safe and easy to use.  However, other experts disagree, stating that “Dry-cask storage 
may sound simple; it is not” (Zorpette, 2001).  There is no question that dry cask storage also 
involves a certain risk factor, but the major issue for discussion is determining whether or not 
this risk is greater than that associated with using fuel pools.  The next section in this chapter will 
discuss the various arguments presented for and against both types of interim storage. 
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IV. Analysis of Dry Cask versus Fuel Pool Storage 
Both fuel pools and dry casks have strengths and weaknesses as potential interim storage 
options.  Analyzing the issue of storing spent nuclear fuel requires being familiar with these 
differences.  The existing literature suggests that the most central issues that need to be taken 
into consideration when comparing fuel pools and dry casks are the costs of construction and 
operation, safety and security factors, public representation, and reprocessing. Two of the main 
reasons dry cask storage is criticized are because there is little known about the safety and cost of 
such storage.  Also, the process is more complicated.  
 
A. Cost  
Capital costs for dry cask storage involves upfront costs and actual labor and material 
costs.  The upfront costs include the initial costs, such as the NRC licensing, engineering, design, 
materials, equipment, construction of initial storage pads, security setup, and testing (Bunn, 
2001).  Labor and material fees include the storage system, loading equipment, costs of the casks 
themselves, and any additional pads and labor.  According to Zorpette, the installation of these 
dry casks are expensive and a complex process (Zorpette, 2001).  The total upfront costs are 
estimated to be from $8-12 million.   
The actual cost for an individual dry cask is approximately $1 million.  This cost can also 
be calculated as $60-80 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM) which would include the cost of 
purchasing, labor, loading, etc. of a dry cask unit, instead of being seen as an overall lumped 
estimate of $1 million per dry cask (Bunn, 2001).  It is possible to reduce costs of dry cask 
storage by re-racking the nuclear waste in order to accommodate more waste in each dry cask.  
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This method would reduce the number of overall casks necessary which would help to minimize 
cost. 
Although the cost of dry cask storage seems high, compared to fuel pools the long term 
cost is much less (Bunn, 2001).  The maintenance costs of dry cask storage is very small since 
once the casks are loaded they can sit for decades without too much change.  As can be seen in 
Table 2 below, the overall cost of fuel pool storage is almost double that of cask storage in Japan.  
The study was also conducted at different scales of 3,000 and 10,000 tons.  All results concluded 
that dry cask storage is more cost efficient over the long term.  Also, in comparison to 
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, which costs more than $900/kgHM in current European 
facilities, dry cask storage proves to be more cost effective (Bunn, 2001). 
 
Table 2.  Breakdown of Estimated Storage Costs for 5,000 ton Facility in Japan 
 
Source: Bunn, 2001 
 
B. Safety 
Safety is an issue that applies to any form of nuclear waste storage.  Safety management 
refers to measures that protect spent nuclear fuel storage facilities against failure, damage, 
human error, and other accidents that would cause a leakage of radiation into the public 
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(BRWM, 2006).  In terms of safety, there are advantages and disadvantages to both wet and dry 
forms of interim nuclear waste storage.   
Dry casks are considered safer than fuel pools for a couple of reasons (BRWM, 2006).  
First, there is less fuel in a single dry cask than there is in spent fuel pools.  Less radioactive 
material means less risk in case of an accident. Usually, several dry casks are used to store the 
nuclear waste in a particular location.  Second, dry casks are designed to ensure adequate passive 
heat removal and radiation shielding for regular operations as well as in the event of a tip over, 
and some protection against external assaults (NAS, 2005).  Fuel pools do not use a passive heat 
removal system; they require constant monitoring in order to ensure that cooling is effective.  
However, research is still being done in order to find out the long term effects of storing nuclear 
waste in dry casks (Bunn, 2001). 
While the use of fuel pools cannot be eliminated entirely (namely because they are 
needed to allow waste to cool down before they can be transferred to another storage site), many 
members of the scientific community, as well as members of various environmental agencies, 
feel that fuel pools are being used more than they should be.  According to the Nuclear 
Information and Resource Service, “Fuel pools were not designed for more than temporary 
storage (NIRS, 1997).”   
As stated earlier, the maintenance of dry casks is much more cost effective than that of 
fuel pools.  In addition, the maintenance process is much simpler because it is a passive and dry 
form of nuclear waste storage.  This dry form of storage brings down the likelihood of human 
error when maintaining the nuclear waste (Zhang, 2007). In fuel pools, the levels of water in 
these pools must constantly be monitored to ensure safety (Zhang, 2007).  Note however, that 
dry casks must still be monitored regularly in order to ensure that the temperatures of the dry 
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casks are not reaching critical levels.  Protecting radiation levels and monitoring temperature are 
some of the many precautionary measures that nuclear power plants take to endure safety.    
 
C. Security 
Whether or not dry casks are safer from terrorist attacks than fuel pools is debated.  For 
example, Wald argues that a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool could be worse than the 
Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union (Wald, 2003).  However, the NRC believes that the 
study was wrong and that fuel pools are not vulnerable (Wald, 2003).  This issue will here on out 
be referred to as “security,” in the same manner as BRWM defined it: measures to protect spent 
fuel storage facilities against terrorism, sabotage, attacks, or theft (BRWM, 2006).   
If a terrorist attack potentially drained a fuel pool of all its coolant liquid, it could lead to 
a fire (BRWM, 2006).  A fire from a fuel pool would release radioactive materials into the 
surroundings.  This type of attack could potentially make fuel pools very dangerous.   
The Spent Fuel Storage Licensing document legislated by the US NRC contains the 
licensing requirements for the independent storage of spent nuclear fuel (USNRC, 2007).  The 
design of some of the cask systems do provide protection against attacks, but were not designed 
with this strategy.  The regulations require that the dry cask storage facilities (ISFSIs) must be 
located in a protected area of a nuclear power plant site.  A trained, armed force must provide 
surveillance of the dry cask storage site (BRWM, 2006).  The NRC believes that even if 
terrorists were to take over a dry cask site the amount of damage to the casks would be very 
minimal.   
However, the Army Field Manual FM-25, May 1967 states that 150 pounds of high 
explosive (PETN) can blow over a six-foot deep twelve foot diameter crater in concrete that is 
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reinforced with heavy steel.  These types of explosives can be carried in normal sized backpacks 
(New England Coalition, 2004).  Thus, there is controversy as to whether or not terrorists would 
be able to damage dry casks enough to expose unhealthy amounts of radiation. 
 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, studies have been conducted to 
provide a better assessment of possible terrorism at dry cask storage sites (National Center for 
Public Policy Research, 2001).  Sandia National Laboratories analyzed the response of dry casks 
to potential terrorist attacks in a number of ways (BRWM, 2006).  Sandia analyzed three vertical 
casks and one horizontal design with an airline traveling at high speed directly into these casks.  
Most of the results from these tests are classified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 
generally the results showed that some attacks would damage dry casks (BRWM, 2006).  
However, this damage did not cause radiation leakage.  The predicted releases of radioactive 
material, mostly noble gases, would be very small.  
The closed, secure system of dry casks provides a robust and seemingly impermeable 
method of securing of the waste.  Initial research shows that an airplane impact could damage 
some types of casks, but the predicted release of radioactive material would be small for that 
mostly noble gases being emitted (BRWM, 2006).  In addition to this, the BRWM report on the 
safety and security of spent nuclear fuel released in 2004 suggests that plant-specific 
vulnerability analyses carried out by the NRC might determine that earlier movements of spent 
fuel from fuel pools to dry casks might reduce the potential consequences of a terrorist attack 
(BRWM, 2006). 
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D. Public Representation 
 Public representation is one of the major gaps in information on current background 
information regarding interim storage of nuclear waste.  This refers to the ability of the public 
around a planned interim storage site to voice their opinions on issues such as cost, safety, 
security, etc.   
 In one power plant region (Maine Yankee), a community advisory group was setup in 
order to better relations between the public and the power plant company.  This is known as the 
Citizen’s Advisory Panel or CAP (Ferdinand, 2008).  The Maine Yankee is a decommissioned 
power plant.  Upon decommissioning, Maine Yankee transferred all of its spent nuclear fuel into 
dry casks (Ferdinand, 2008).  The Maine Yankee CAP was established with the intention to 
increase open communication between the public and plant representatives.  It also provides 
education on the Maine Yankee decommissioning process.   
 
E. Reprocessing 
Reprocessing is a potential step in the fuel cycle which scientists believe could be very 
beneficial to the future of nuclear power by minimizing nuclear waste and maximizing fuel 
input.  Reprocessing is the act of separating fissionable uranium and plutonium from spent 
nuclear fuel which later can be reused to fuel the nuclear reactor.  This method, although costly, 
can minimize the amount of waste stored at fuel pools and in dry casks (Hippel, 2001; Schlissel, 
2008).   
Reprocessing is not a new technology; the first reprocessing plant was commissioned in 
1963.  Today, however, reprocessing is not used in the United States.  The reason for this is 
because the fissionable plutonium that is extracted from reprocessing is weapons grade and 
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reprocessing is not economical (Andrews, 2006; Schlissel, 2008).  Since the end of the Cold 
War, the United States policy has been to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since this 
time, federal funding of reprocessing has been restricted to limit the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.  Yet in 2006 President Bush recommended that cleaner, proliferation-resistant, and 
more economical forms of reprocessing be considered for the future (Andrews, 2006).     
F. Summary 
The savings in the cost of upkeep, management and security gives dry casks a clear 
advantage in overall price and value of a means of storage.  However, regardless of the method, 
there are still many factors that have to be addressed while handling and storing a dangerous 
substance such as spent nuclear fuel.  A summary of all the types of the analysis between dry 
cask and fuel pool storage based on cost, safety, security, etc. are presented in Table 3.  As you 
can see from Table 3, dry casks are safer, more secure, and less costly. 
Each issue is shown in a comparison between dry casks and fuel pools.  Overall, costs 
were compared by judging long term costs.  Safety was compared by the likelihood of zirconium 
fires occurring, and security compared which form of storage was more vulnerable for damage.  
The other issues involved were quality of public representation and the role of reprocessing.  
These were broader categories not specifically meant to be classified with either dry cask or fuel 
pools. 
The next chapter of the report will involve research methods in order to better understand 
people’s concerns about the issues below.  It will begin by presenting a set of research questions, 
methods of research, and conclude with methods of analysis for our data. 
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Table 3.  Dry casks versus fuel pools comparison matrix 
Types of concerns 
about interim 
storage 
Dry-cask  Fuel pool  
Cost Most research stated that dry-cask 
storage was costly to design and 
initiate, but no cost thereafter.  This 
initial cost is due to extraction and 
the construction of the casks (Bunn, 
2001). 
Very costly to maintain 
requires more man-power 
and monitoring, but initial 
design is cheaper short-term 
(Bunn, 2001).  Requires 
constant monitoring to 
make sure water flow is 
high enough, more cost 
(Zhang, 2007). 
Safety  Less spent fuel concentrated in one 
area (small and compartmentalized 
into different casks), meaning 
smaller fires (Bunn, 2001). Safer 
since it is dry and uses passive 
cooling. 
Zirconium fires (1000 
o
C) 
can occur easily if water 
supply is diminished 
(Zhang, 2007; NIRS, 2002). 
Security Actual damage from terrorist attack 
is estimated to be small (BRWM, 
2006). 
Much more vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks, more 
damage (Zhang, 2007). 
Quality of Public 
Representation 
One of the major gaps in information we wanted to explore. 
Role of 
reprocessing of 
spent nuclear fuel 
This method, although costly, can minimize the amount of waste 
stored at fuel pools and in dry casks (Hippel, 2001). 
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3 Research Methods 
 
In this project, our main goal was to investigate how the public felt about interim storage 
of nuclear waste and what their concerns are.  In this chapter we will present our research 
methods for investigating these issues.  We will first present our research questions.  Next, we 
will discuss our methods for obtaining data and, finally, discuss our approach to analysis. 
 
I. Research Questions  
Our research questions relate to understanding views of people about important issues 
regarding nuclear waste interim storage.  We specifically wanted to understand their views about 
cost, security, safety, and public representation.  We sought to answer four research questions. 
First, what are the types of concerns that people have about interim storage of nuclear 
waste?   
The first question allowed us to investigate issues involved with nuclear waste storage that 
we may not have anticipated. Our background research suggested that people are concerned 
about cost, security, etc.  However, there may be other issues which may not have been 
considered. 
Second, do people feel that interim storage does an adequate job of containing radiation 
and is it secure from terrorist attacks? 
This involves safety and security issues concerning interim storage of nuclear waste.  We 
wanted to understand how people feel about the general safety and security of interim storage 
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sites and whether people believe that the radiation is contained.  Nuclear waste on-site storage 
sites are located throughout the United States and in many cases in very densely populated areas.  
Third, is the public represented properly in the current system of dry cask licensing? 
One of the major gaps in information involved information about how the public was 
represented in the current system of dry cask licensing.  We wanted to explore information on 
this topic in order to fill this gap. 
Fourth, do different kinds of people express different ideas about the relative benefits and 
risks of interim storage?   
This question is an extension of the earlier ones.  It can involve any topic regarding interim 
storage of nuclear waste such as cost, equity, safety, or security, etc.  The answer to this question 
allowed us to compare and contrast the views of different groups of people.  
 
 II. Methods of Research 
We used two methods of gathering data: archival research and interviewing. 
A. Archival Research 
The first method we used to locate and understand public concerns about interim storage of 
nuclear waste was archival research.  Archival research involves analyzing documents containing 
information pertinent to answering our research questions on interim storage (ARTS, 2002).  
Public documents strictly concerning dry cask or fuel pool interim storage of nuclear waste were 
searched for on the internet.   
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The main site that was searched was the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Public Document 
Room (nrc.gov).  Several documents containing public comments were found.  For example, 
public comments regarding the license renewal of the Vermont Yankee and Indian Point plants 
were found (U.S.NRC, 2007).  Most of the public comments found were related to the nuclear 
power plants and not storage of nuclear waste.  Only one document containing public comments 
about waste storage was found and it was for the Diablo Canyon site located in California (US 
NRC, 2007).  This document was used in the analysis. 
 
B.  Interviews 
Our second approach to gathering data involved conducting structured interviews of several 
subjects to answer our research questions.  Structured interviews have a specific set of questions 
in a specific order which are used as a basis for every interview (Practical Assessment Research 
& Evaluation, 1997). 
We split up the interviews into four different categories of subjects: general public, interest 
groups, government agency representatives, and power plant consultants or representatives, as 
shown in Table 4.  Two of the interviewees were retired from a position in the category we listed 
them under; they are a retired plant consultant and retired town planner.   
Table 4.  Number of People Interviewed 
Category Persons Interviewed 
Member of the general public 2 
Member of an interest group 4 
Member of the government 3 
Power plant consultant/representative 2 
Total 11 
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Two members of the general public were interviewed.  One was an editor of an online 
journal concerning nuclear waste and power.  Another was a member of an environmental group 
situated in Maine.  We felt that concerns of members of the public were relevant to answering 
our research questions, since it would give us an idea of what concerns there are about interim 
storage. 
The group with most interviews was with members of interest groups (four in all).  We felt 
that this was an important category since these were people who were involved in dealing with 
nuclear waste in an active community.  People from the following interest groups were 
interviewed: Citizen’s Awareness Network, Union of Concerned Scientists, Alliance for Nuclear 
Responsibility, and the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability.  People from interest groups are 
crucial for gathering information for our research because interest groups usually represent 
people that seek to influence political decisions, and in this case decisions on nuclear waste 
storage. 
Members of the government were the next major group of subjects.  Three members of the 
government were interviewed, 1) a lawyer in the Dept. of Environmental Quality in Utah, 2) a 
member of the US NRC, and 3) a retired town planner for Wiscasset Maine, which is the 
location of the Yankee Maine decommissioned power plant.  Government representatives are 
important for our research since they are the direct policymakers of nuclear waste storage issues 
in the United States. 
The last category of people is power plant representatives or power plant consultants.  Two 
members of this category were interviewed.  The plant representative interviewed was from the 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power company.  This provided us a view of the Maine Yankee situation 
from the plants perspective. The plant consultant interviewed worked at many plants and had 
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vast knowledge in the area of spent nuclear fuel storage licensing and was involved in the 
decommissioning of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. 
 
i. Interview Questions 
All interviews were conducted by telephone and were recorded.  Each subject was notified 
that the call was being recorded, and their consent was obtained.  Four of the interviews were 
conducted by four group members, and the remaining seven were conducted either individually 
or in pairs.  We wanted to focus on the concerns of the people we were interviewing, not the 
specific details and numbers of cost, etc.  The first question served as an ice breaker and is 
twofold.  First, it gave us an idea about whom we were interviewing and, secondly in what 
capacity they were involved in the subject of nuclear waste storage: 
1. Please tell us a little bit about yourself and what your interests are regarding 
interim storage of nuclear waste? 
 Would you describe yourself as a member of the general public, a member of an 
interest group, a member of the government, or a plant representative? 
 In what ways have you been involved in the issues concerning interim storage of 
nuclear waste? 
 How did you get involved initially in this field of interest? 
 What do you wish to accomplish with your involvement in your organization? 
 
The next question directly asked about the most important issue regarding interim nuclear 
waste storage.   This question was the major starting point for our research.  It allowed us to 
understand which types of people associate more importance with some issues over others.   
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2. What do you consider to be the most important issue regarding interim nuclear waste 
storage?  Why? 
 Safety, cost, security, etc. 
 (If the issue is a direct concern to the interviewee) What do you feel can be done, 
if anything, to positively affect this concern? 
 
The next question is a derivation of the previous one.  The first part allows us to situate the 
subject’s views based on a particular nuclear power plant site if applicable.  This allowed us to 
compare the situation between, for example, Diablo Canyon which is located in a seismically 
active area, versus Maine Yankee, a decommissioned power plant.  The second part of the 
question involves the comparison between fuel pools and dry casks.  This is another area of 
debate we wanted to gather information about, weighing each type of storage with the different 
metrics of cost, security, safety, etc. 
 
3. Do you believe that the use of dry cask storage is a good strategy for your site (or a site, 
if applicable) for storing spent nuclear fuel?  Why or why not? 
 Are you concerned about running out of space in fuel pools? 
 
Our fourth question allowed us to find out what issues people outside of the nuclear industry 
had brought to the people we interviewed. This question allowed us to indirectly gather 
information about what people outside of the nuclear realm were concerned about.  We also 
wanted to find out about issues concerning the licensing, regulations, and other process 
information regarding specific sites. 
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4. Do you get the sense that the public feels confident in the way they are represented in the 
current system?  
 Has the public expressed concerns to you directly?  
 If so, what subjects do they bring up most?  
 How do you address these concerns?  
 
III. Methods of Analysis 
The data we gathered are qualitative which requires us to use a qualitative data analysis 
technique.  We used qualitative content analysis to analyze our data.  This form of analysis 
involves condensing information such as interviews, field notes, and other types of unobtrusive 
data in order for systematic comparisons to be made (Berg, 1995).  
The categories we used for making comparisons were developed using both an inductive and 
deductive approach.  An inductive approach involves identifying categories or themes based on 
existing information.  We identified five major categories using this method, as described in the 
background chapter (see Table 3). 
In the deductive approach, we formed two additional categories about reprocessing and 
regional storage.  Reprocessing was a recurring piece of information that was shared by the 
people interviewed.  Regional storage was also suggested by three people interviewed.  
Therefore, we felt it necessary to explore these subjects in our analysis. 
Afterwards, we determined whether the individual’s response to questions on a specific topic 
represented little or no concern, represented major concerns, represented concern in some 
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circumstances but not others, or did not comment on the issue.   This was done by reviewing the 
transcripts to see how positively or negatively they felt on each issue.  We used this information 
in our analysis. 
We also included demographic information about these individuals.  First, we classified what 
type of group these individuals considered themselves to be part of, as either an interest group, a 
governmental agency, a plant representative or a member of the general public.   
Then, we further organized the data by which plant the individuals interviewed lived closest 
to.  Those who were not affiliated with a power plant site (e.g., NRC regulator and people who 
worked for national organizations) were excluded in this part of the analysis.  
 
IV. Summary 
The main goal of our project was to understand how different groups of people felt about 
interim storage of nuclear waste.  We were particularly interested in what their concerns were 
and why.  We had several research questions that targeted gathering this type of data.  We 
conducted two forms of research: archival and interviewing.   
Our method of analysis involved content analysis.  We organized the data into six 
different types of concerns, and further organized the data by associating people with nuclear 
power plants.  In the next chapter, we will discuss the results obtained from gathering data and 
use the method of analysis discussed in this chapter. 
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4 Results 
Our goal was to get an idea of how people with different backgrounds feel about the 
issues surrounding nuclear waste.  We categorized these issues into six categories.  These 
categories are cost, safety, security, how well the public is represented, issues associated with 
reprocessing, and private fuel storage.  We focused on these six categories because our 
background and empirical research indicated that they are the issues that raised the greatest 
amount of concerns among members of the public, government and power plant managers and 
employees.  In the following sections, we provide our findings about each of these.  We also 
wanted to see how positively or negatively each individual felt about the categories that they 
commented on.  These feelings are summarized in Table 5. 
 
 
A. Cost 
One topic we wanted to investigate was what people thought about the costs associated 
with interim storage, and any suggestions they could make about those costs.  Among these 
issues were whether dry casks were cheaper for long term use than fuel pools, who should be 
responsible for handling the costs in the event of an emergency, who should be responsible for 
handling the costs of storing the waste, and who will be responsible for handling the costs in the 
event that any of the companies go bankrupt. 
First, many people consider whether or not dry casks have a cost advantage over fuel 
pools.  Two subjects claimed that using interim storage is cheaper than fuel pools, and suggest 
this is a reason why dry cask storage may be advantageous over fuel pools.  We spoke with the 
public and government affairs director of a power plant as well as a member of the Maine 
Yankee Community Advisory Panel who stated that unlike fuel pools, dry casks do not require 
40 
 
any moving parts and have lower operating costs. These lower operating costs over time save the 
company enough money to pay for the erection of the dry cask unit.  These claims are consistent 
with the findings in our background chapter. 
  Secondly, we wanted to determine what people’s opinions were about who they felt 
should be responsible for handling the cost of an emergency.  In our interview with a member of 
Utah’s Department of Environmental Quality, she mentioned that in Utah it has not been clearly 
established who should be responsible for taking care of this in an emergency.  She says she has 
brought this issue up to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but the issue still has 
not been resolved.  She mentions that it is still unclear who needs to be responsible for paying 
the cost of training employees for an emergency.  It is also unclear who should be responsible for 
paying to clean up waste after an incident.   
A third issue that was raised was how the individuals we spoke with felt about who 
should be responsible for covering the costs of storing waste for the interim time period. The 
individual from Utah’s Department of Environmental Quality feels that the costs of interim 
storage should be handled by the companies that profit from nuclear energy.  A member for the 
Union of Concerned Scientists on the other hand, has been fighting to pass bills which would 
make the federal government responsible for covering all expenses related to purchasing and 
setting up casks for interim storage, since the federal government was originally supposed to 
remove the waste once it was sufficiently cooled in the fuel pools; making interim storage 
unnecessary. 
Finally, in the case of regional fuel storage the representative from Utah brings up the 
point that we cannot ensure that the companies that plan to take the steps to ensure that private 
waste storage sites will last as long as the storage site itself. She feels that it is presumptuous to 
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assume that a company can prove that they will be around for tens or even hundreds of years to 
store the nuclear waste they take in. She wonders what will happen in the event of the collapse of 
these private fuel storage companies; who will be left in charge of upkeep.  An individual from 
the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility also expressed similar concerns about who will pay for 
the upkeep of dry cask units on site of plants that might one day go out of business.  He feels that 
it is unclear who is responsible for keeping the waste safe and secure: “Who is going to be left 
holding the bill for the long term security, surveillance, [and] maintenance on this?” 
 
B. Safety 
We also wanted to determine people’s feelings about how safely waste is stored at 
interim storage sites.  Among the issues that were raised were the risks of zirconium fires, 
radiation leakage, earthquake damage and casks falling over.  As we conducted our interviews, 
none of the individuals we spoke with expressed any major concerns about radiation leakages, 
fires, or casks tipping over.  However, there were concerns raised regarding seismic activity and 
the dangers it could place on interim storage.  
Many individuals feel that dry casks are well designed and do not have any safety 
concerns related to them.  A former Maine Yankee CAP member stated: “I studied those [casks] 
in depth, and am very comfortable standing next to them.”  First of all, they are short and robust, 
with minimal risk of tipping over.  Secondly, the material that stores the waste has a minimal risk 
of catching fire.  Finally, he stated that in the event that a cask is damaged or its safety is 
otherwise compromised, the casks can easily be placed inside another cask before any radiation 
would be exposed to the environment.  He then went on to say that storage casks have been 
designed to last for fifty years, and the government has approved the casks for storing waste for 
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up to twenty years.  An individual working at the United State Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
feels that the casks are very well designed, and goes on to say that: “Our staff have degrees in 
many areas, these folks do a very careful study of the issues we deal with.”  He concludes by 
saying that the casks do their job well enough to contain radiation and keep the fuel from 
overheating, and that the casks are designed to be short enough so that he is not concerned that 
they will fall over. 
 These experts stated that they were not concerned with the other issues pertaining to the 
safety of interim storage.  None of the individuals we spoke with brought up any concerns about 
radiation contaminating the environment or nearby communities, nor did they elaborate on the 
process of transporting spent fuel and the safeguards that have been put in place.  Also, they said 
that they are not concerned about how safely waste is transported.  Transportation is a concern to 
some of the individuals that we spoke with and is related to interim storage because waste must 
be transferred from the reactor core to an interim site, and there is always a risk of an accident or 
terrorist attack happening.  For example, a retired nuclear engineer emphasized how overblown 
he feels many of the public’s concerns were regarding the transportation of nuclear fuel, stating: 
“What the public doesn’t realize is that nuclear fuel moves around this country all the time.” 
 The only issue of concern pertaining to safety that was raised in our interviews was the 
issue of seismic activity near storage facilities.  A member from the Alliance for Nuclear 
Responsibility mentioned that he is concerned that the level of seismic activity near many of 
these sites is underestimated before the site is actually built and that these sites are not required 
to take any further precautions after the site has been approved.  This individual said that in the 
case of Diablo Canyon, they discovered that the site was at risk of withstanding an earthquake 
which could cause substantial damage to the casks.  However, since the NRC had already 
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approved the site, no one was required to make any changes, and the site remains at risk.  This 
individual also states that if a cask was ruptured in an earthquake, it would need to be transported 
along the seafront to be repackaged, and this would place it at risk of being targeted by terrorists.  
He did state however, that dry casks are not at as great a risk of being compromised in an 
earthquake as fuel pools are.  
However, according to public comments from NRC documents, members of the NRC 
claim that the casks are very safe and are not at risk of being damaged by earthquakes.  
Transcripts from a public meeting regarding Diablo Canyon showed that the NRC went to efforts 
to address the issue of seismic activity and the threat to dry casks.  A resident expressed concerns 
about whether or not earthquakes could damage these casks.  A senior level advisor assured the 
individual that these dry casks go through a drop test that can withstand much greater impacts 
than any earthquake that would be produced near that site.  He also said that the dry casks are 
even safer than the reactor core. 
 
C. Security 
The issue of security has been brought to the front of many peoples’ minds since the 9/11 
attacks, and we wanted to see what people’s opinions were about what was being done and what 
they felt should be done to keep waste secure.  The concerns brought up include the issue of 
whether waste should be stored long-term in fuel pool or dry casks, the risks of airplanes being 
crashed into dry casks or fuel pools, and terrorists being able to fire missiles at sites.  Although 
many of the individuals that we spoke with felt that although security was important, they did not 
have any major concerns about how it is being implemented. Yet, many of the interviewees felt 
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that spent fuel storage sites are a possible target for terrorist attacks. Security was commented on 
in nearly every interview carried out. In fact, some of the interviewees felt that security issues are 
more of a concern than other safety issues and cost considerations. 
The first issue that was raised was whether fuel pools were as secure a storage method as 
dry casks.  A member of the Union for Concerned Scientists feels that fuel should be moved 
from fuel pools to dry casks as soon as possible, because they are easier to secure.  He says: 
“Spent fuel pools should be emptied to their minimum level” and that plants should “accelerate 
the transfer of irradiated fuel to dry casks.”  However, a representative from the American 
Nuclear Society disagrees, stating that he has no concerns about using fuel pools as means of 
long-term storage.  A representative from the NRC concurs, saying that both fuel pools and dry 
casks are well designed and that he does not have any concerns about either of them being 
penetrated by terrorists.                                                                                                                              
 A second issue that people we spoke with brought up as a concern is the risk of airplanes 
being flown into dry casks.  A member of the public associated with the Yankee Maine CAP has 
expressed that in the event terrorists attempted to crash a plane into a dry cask storage site, it 
would probably be very difficult for them to strike a storage cask.  He also says that even if a 
plane did strike a cask, the casks would absorb the impact and it would be unlikely that the cask 
would be ruptured.  A member from the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company also said that 
the risk of an airplane successfully rupturing a cask is not a significant concern because the casks 
are well designed and the security issues have been adequately addressed.  Unfortunately, the 
Maine Yankee representative would not comment any further on this issue, because he did not 
want to compromise security procedures. 
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However, other individuals that we spoke with did raise a few concerns pertaining to the 
security of interim storage facilities.  The first concern that was raised was that there are a 
number of storage sites scattered over the country.  A Maine Yankee CAP member that we spoke 
with said that waste should be stored at large regional sites, because this would reduce the 
number of storage sites around the country and would decrease the likelihood of a site’s security 
being compromised. 
A final concern that has been raised is that at some sites the dry casks are left in plain 
view, which can make them an easier target for terrorists.  A representative from the Citizens 
Awareness Network says that she does not understand why so little is being done to guard these 
casks or hide them from view.   A representative from the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility 
says that at a number of these sites no actions are being taken to shield the casks from view.  He 
suggests that an earthen berm should be set up around the site to limit visibility and to act as a 
shield against missiles.  A representative from the NRC feels that earthen berms may not be 
necessary at every site, but that they are useful not only in hindering terrorist attacks but also for 
shielding radiation.  An individual from the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability agrees that these 
casks should not be in plain view, but rather than using an earthen berm he suggests that interim 
casks should be turned into hardened casks which are harder to see and make more difficult 
targets.  He states that we should: “make it (nuclear waste) as safe as possible” and that  
“hardened onsite [gives] substantial security and physical protection measures.” 
             
D. Public concerns and how they are addressed 
Individuals have differing views as to how well they feel the public is being represented 
and how well their concerns are addressed.  Some individuals feel that the members of the public 
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are satisfied with how their voices are heard.  On the other hand, others feel that the public is 
very frustrated and feels that it is not listened to.  However, one of the individuals we spoke with 
said that the degree to which the public’s voice is heard varies among the different plants. 
 
Some of the interviewees expressed that they feel that the general public is satisfied with 
how well their voices are heard.  A representative from the website Nuclear.com for example 
says that most communities near nuclear power plants are in favor of the use of nuclear energy, 
once they get used to the idea and see it is not a safety risk. He feels that this makes the issue of 
dry cask storage less of an issue in these areas.  A representative from the NRC says that he has 
been very involved in these meetings and points out that the public’s questions and comments 
are listened to carefully in public meetings and NRC members make every reasonable effort to 
explain and keep track of them.  He says: “I feel we are putting forth a significant exerted effort, 
to be out with the local community explaining what we do from a regulatory perspective and our 
licensing and regulations of these storage facilities.” 
In fact, some individuals say that not only do they feel that the public is listened to, but 
also that their concerns are well addressed.  A member of the Yankee Maine Community 
Advisory Panel says that he has seen numerous complaints and concerns brought up by the 
public and CAP, and that Maine Yankee and the NRC have addressed these concerns.  The CAP 
members feel that the Maine Yankee plant formed the CAP to allow people to organize into a 
forum where they can all raise their concerns, CAP members feel that this opportunity has helped 
the surrounding community adjust to the process.  
However, not everyone feels that the public’s voice is well heard.  For example, a 
representative from Utah’s Department of Environmental Quality stated that the public in Utah is 
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very frustrated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and how they have failed to act on the 
public comments.  She feels that the NRC tends to ignore any concerns that the public raises 
until the law mandates that they act on them.  She says that: “The way the things are set up the 
only way you can insure that your issues are addressed is in an adjudicatory process.”  A 
representative from the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility also feels that the process is not run 
very democratically.  He says: “This is not a process that is easy for the public to engage in.”  He 
brings up the question of whether we want to use nuclear power if it requires such a high level of 
confidentiality.  He feels that the need for confidentiality in and of itself raises questions of the 
rationality of the institution of nuclear power: “if a form of energy requires a secrecy that we the 
members of the community can’t be told [about], then we need to ask the fundamental question; 
is this a type of power we want to have?” 
One of the issues that were brought up by a large number of people is the lack of 
cooperation of the NRC.  A representative from the Citizen’s Awareness Network said that in her 
opinion, the public has no faith in the NRC, and feel that none of their concerns are taken 
seriously. She said that at Yankee Rowe, the public felt that the NRC was not giving them any 
chance of participating in any of the decision making processes.  The representative from the 
Union of Concerned Scientists that we spoke with said that in the licensing process the only time 
that the public has to object to a site is when the site is first certified by the NRC.  The public 
often is not even told where a cask is being placed, and as a result they often feel blindsided.  
This representative said that the only way that the public can fight a dry cask storage site from 
being set up in their community is to sue, and even then it is difficult to get the courts to rule 
favorably if the public did not first object to the site being constructed. 
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While there are many individuals who feel the public is well represented, as well as many 
who feel that it is not, some feel that the public representation varies on a case by case basis.  
The former nuclear engineering consultant that we spoke with said that: “A responsible plant will 
open up to the public for comment, but there is no requirement for them to do so.”  However, he 
also says that once a plant gets the operating license for an ISFSI: “The public doesn’t have the 
ability to say no.”  He feels that the public is therefore represented only as well as the plant 
allows them opportunities to have their voices heard. 
 
E. Issues Associated with Reprocessing 
The issue of reprocessing was brought up in a few of the interviews carried out. 
Reprocessing is based on the idea that the uranium inside spent fuel is a very valuable resource 
which could be reprocessed and turned into something more useful.  A member of the American 
Nuclear Society says: “There are so many conflicts in the world over resources, and it seems like 
a shame to take this very valuable and fairly rare resource, enriched uranium, and bury it away as 
waste.”  The former nuclear engineering consultant that we spoke with feels that future 
generations will have the technology to extract the useful isotopes from spent nuclear fuel more 
efficiently and safely than they can today.  He states that the longest lasting radioisotopes in 
spent nuclear fuel are plutonium and uranium that can be reprocessed and used.  He feels that if 
we extract these useful isotopes from spent fuel we will decrease the amount of time that it is 
hazardous for by hundreds of years “The worst thing to do with plutonium is to store it, the best 
thing to do with plutonium is to fission it.”   
 
 
49 
 
F. The benefits of Regional Storage 
This section will discuss the issues brought up by interviewees that related to the issue of 
regional storage. The issues brought up in the background research and the interviews carried out 
suggested that regional storage issues ran deeper than the scope of this report. However, we were 
able to gather data on the debate of regional storage versus on-site storage, including the problem 
of equity, or the fairness of burdening individuals with waste that others benefited from.  
The issue of having a regional storage system as opposed to storing waste at a number of 
different sites was addressed directly in some of our interviews. A Maine Yankee CAP member 
said that regional storage would be good because it would lower the number of ISFSI sites in the 
country, thereby reducing the likelihood that USNRC regulators might accidently overlook 
aspects related to safety during cask inspections. The interviewee in this case is referring to 
neglect, which they felt was more likely to occur with more plants being open. The nuclear 
engineering consultant that we spoke with said that he believes waste should be moved to a 
regional storage site immediately where it can be stored before Yucca Mountain opens. 
Others were against regional storage, or more specifically, the inequities associated with 
it. Equity in this sense refers to fair practices associated with interim storage of nuclear waste. 
Specifically, equity revolves around the issue of a site storing its waste in a town that does not 
benefit from the electricity produced. A member of the Citizens Awareness Network brought up 
the concern that if waste is allowed to move from one community to be stored in another, the 
burden of waste is simply being passed on. This individual lived in a town that had nuclear waste 
that needed to be stored, and stated that she did not think it was fair to pass the burden of nuclear 
waste storage onto another town that did not benefit from the electricity produced by the plant.  
A second individual, who was a member of the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, also 
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expressed that the individuals who benefit from nuclear energy should be responsible for the 
waste they produce, rather than passing it on to someone else. This individual stated that Utah 
public officials are opposed to hosting private fuel storage sites, because the state of Utah has no 
nuclear reactors and creates no nuclear waste. She felt that storing waste which is produced in 
other states is unfair, because the state of Utah did not benefit from the power generation of the  
plant that produced the waste.  
 
G.  Demographical Data 
We were able to find a variance in opinions with regards to the issues associated with the 
cost of storing spent fuel, how safe the waste is, how well it is secured, whether or not regional 
storage should be implemented, how well the public’s view are represented, and whether or not 
waste should be reprocessed rather than sent to a long term storage site.  We grouped these 
categories based on the groups we spoke with.  Also, since a number of the individuals we spoke 
with were from Maine Yankee, we grouped what these individuals said. 
We interviewed four different members of interest groups.  These individuals put 
emphasis on the issues of security, cost, and public representation. These members tended to 
worry most about the overall security of dry casks in the event of a terrorist attack, ISFSI owners 
going bankrupt, and the lack of public representation in the current process of ISFSI licensing. 
The interest group members we contacted also seemed to find the NRC difficult to work with; 
saying that they needed to file suit to see action taken on their concerns. 
Interest group members did not bring up the issue of reprocessing, and tended to avoid 
the technological safety issues. Their issues tended to be more social and political; calling for 
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more efficient public representation, more sound security measures (like Hardened On-site 
Storage and increased security staff), and for the federal government to take care of the costs 
associated with interim storage.  
We also interviewed three individuals who work or had worked for the government.  All 
of these individuals said that they felt that the dry casks at interim sites are safe.  Two of them 
felt that fuel should be moved from fuel pools to dry casks as soon as possible, while the third 
felt that fuel pools are a sufficiently safe and secure method for storing spent nuclear fuel.  The 
two individuals who had concerns about storing fuel in fuel pools also expressed concerns about 
interim storage becoming a long-term option for storing waste.  Two of the government 
representatives felt that the public is confident about how they are being represented by the NRC, 
while the other felt that the public is very frustrated with how the NRC responds to them.  One 
individual expressed that they were against the regional storage of interim waste. 
The next group that we dealt with was members of the general public.  Both of these 
individuals said that they felt that dry casks are very safe and secure. However, they both raised 
concerns about what needs to be done with waste in the long-term, saying that interim storage is 
not ideal as a permanent storage option.  Both of them say that from their observations, the 
public they deal with is well represented in the planning and relicensing process. 
The last group that we spoke with was plant representatives and consultants.  We spoke 
with two individuals of this demographic, who had very similar concerns and opinions.  First of 
all, they both said that they thought that dry casks are safe and secure.  Also, they are both 
confident with how the public’s concerns are heard and addressed.  However, they are both 
concerned with finding a permanent storage site because interim storage is not a viable option for 
long-term. 
52 
 
We spoke with four different individuals involved in the decommissioning of the Maine 
Yankee plant.  They all felt that the public was well represented, and say that the CAP program 
has been very helpful in addressing citizens’ concerns.  The three individuals who commented on 
fuel pools say that they feel fuel pools are safe, but that that dry casks are safer and that spent 
fuel should be moved to dry casks as soon as it is sufficiently cooled.  They were all content with 
interim storage; however they felt that it is not a good option for storing waste for a long time, 
and say that it is important to develop a better storage method for the long term.   Overall, the 
members of the Maine Yankee CAP were not concerned with how interim storage is being 
handled, but feel that a better long-term option needs to be developed. 
Table 5 shows a visual representation of the demographic data analyzed above.  The table 
is organized by how each individual is affiliated with interim storage, as other a member of an 
interest group, the general public, a plant representative or a government employee.  The five 
dimensions are shown, and are color coded to indicate how positively or negatively the 
individual feels about that dimension.  A red bar indicates that the individual had concerns about 
that issue, a green bar indicates that the individual was not concerned, and a grey bar indicates 
that the individual did not address the concern in their interview, black indicates that it is 
sometimes an issue. 
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Table 5.  Demographic Data Graphical Results 
 
The Community Advisory Panel (CAP) is a community advisory panel at the Maine 
Yankee nuclear power plant site. The Maine Yankee CAP was established in order to increase 
open communication between the public and the facilitators of the Maine Yankee nuclear power 
plant during the decommissioning process of the Maine Yankee. Members on the committee 
were selected based on their involvement with the power plant and on what group each person 
could represent.  
 
H. Summary 
In this chapter, we were able to show how members of different groups felt on various 
issues.  This data was necessary for further analysis.  In the next chapter, we analyze this data so 
that we could come up with findings and conclusions about the topic of interim storage.
Affiliation 
Nearest Power 
Plant Cost Safety Security Public Representation Reprocessing 
Interest Group Wisconsin           
Interest Group Diablo Canyon           
Interest Group Washington           
Interest Group Yankee Rowe           
Public Maine Yankee           
Public Unknown           
Plant Retired Yankee Rowe           
Plant  Maine Yankee           
Government None           
Government 
Retired  Maine Yankee           
Government NRC           
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5 Findings 
 Analysis of the data collected led to seven categories of findings on the issue of interim 
nuclear waste storage; safety, cost, security, public representation, overall support of interim 
storage, reprocessing, and issues associated with regional storage.  
 
A. Safety 
 The radioactivity emitted from spent nuclear fuel is capable of causing cell death or cell 
alteration (Bertell, 1986). Dry casks are used to shield this harmful radiation, which led our 
group to assume that the safety of dry cask storage was a possible issue that would be raised by 
individuals on the topic of interim storage of nuclear waste. Therefore, we asked our 
interviewees questions about how safe they felt dry cask storage of nuclear waste was. Their 
responses and our own background research led to the following finding. 
 
Finding 1: The ability of dry casks to store waste safely is not a significant concern. 
 Ten out of the eleven individuals interviewed did not say that the safety of dry cask 
storage units was an issue of concern to them. When one safety-related concern was expressed, 
the individual did feel that storage in casks was safer than fuel pool storage. 
 The safety-related issue expressed was that dry cask tip-overs due to earthquakes could 
lead to ruptures, and radiation could be released from the cask. However, as stated in the 
background of this report, dry casks are designed to ensure adequate passive heat removal and 
radiation shielding for regular operations as well as in the event of a tip over, and some 
protection against external assaults (NAS, 2005). Also, dry casks go through drop testing to 
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ensure that they can withstand much greater impacts than that which would be caused by an 
earthquake related tip-over (NRC, 2005).  This information suggests that the person’s concern is 
not valid; because it suggests that the casks ability to shield radiation would not be compromised 
in the event of an earthquake.     
 The background information gathered in this report suggests that the process involved in 
loading dry casks and the safety of the final cask have been evaluated and are considered safe by 
regulators (NRC, 2005). The loading of the dry cask canisters is done underwater in fuel pools to 
shield the radiation from the workers and surrounding environment (NRC, 2005). The canisters 
are then welded and placed into a large concrete container (VirtualNuclear, 2008). The canister 
and container together make up what we call a dry cask, and are designed to shield the heat and 
radiation of the waste from the external environment.   
 
B. Cost 
 Cost is important to consider for interim storage strategies because of the large amounts 
of capital needed to license, fill, and erect a dry cask storage unit. According to our sources, the 
total upfront costs for a dry cask storage unit are between $8 and $12-million (Zorpette, 2001). 
After conducting our interviews we found that the issue of cost was raised in the context of who 
should pay for the dry cask storage units, and who should be responsible for the site in the long 
term, not in regard to the total costs of the systems. 
Finding 2A: Who should be responsible for paying for dry cask storage is disputed. 
  Interviewees felt that cost was an issue for dry cask storage, because the company that 
owns the plant has to pay for the casks. This was stated as an issue because the interviewees felt 
the companies that own the plants pass on the bill to the ratepayers by increasing the price of 
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electricity. Interviewees expressed that they felt the federal government was responsible for this 
problem, because they were unable to open the national repository as initially planned. Some 
individuals went as far as to say that the government should pay for the casks in full. 
Finding 2B: The financial ability of ISFSI owners to maintain dry cask units may not be 
sufficient if the company goes out of business. 
 Some of the individuals interviewed expressed concerns about the ability of the company 
in charge of the ISFSI to maintain the facility for large amounts of time. These individuals stated 
that even large companies are at risk of bankruptcy, especially over the possible duration of these 
dry cask storage facilities, which could be in excess of 20 years. These interviewees were 
concerned about who would be responsible for stepping-in and maintaining the waste in such a 
scenario. 
 This is a major concern to many individuals at the moment. It has been speculated that if 
a site owner were to go bankrupt the surrounding community would be left in charge of the costs 
of upkeep. However, we could find nothing written into law that specifies who is responsible for 
the waste in the event of an owner bankruptcy. This seems to validate the concerns of the 
individuals interviewed; no public plan seems to be in place. 
 
C. Security 
 
 We felt that security of dry cask units would be an issue to the individuals interviewed 
due to the fact that dry cask storage units were not designed to withstand terrorist attacks like 
those of September 11
th
, 2001 (NAS, 2005). This information suggests that some individuals 
might question the dry casks ability to withstand an impact from a large aircraft. However, our 
study found that individuals were not concerned specifically with dry cask storage as a method 
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for nuclear waste storage, but rather, they were concerned with how the casks are arranged and 
protected. Some individuals felt that dry cask storage was very safe and that cooled waste should 
be moved to casks immediately to decrease security risks. 
Finding 3: Security of dry casks is important to maintain, but there is very little concern 
about terrorist attacks on dry casks. 
 
 The individuals interviewed felt that dry cask storage is a secure method for storing 
nuclear waste. Many expressed that they were not concerned with the security of the casks, 
because they felt that they were robust enough to keep the waste safe from terrorist attacks. 
However, the individuals interviewed did feel that maintaining adequate levels of security is 
necessary.  
 Dry casks are very robust containers that are designed to store radioactive waste safely 
and securely. Initial research suggests that a large airplane impact would result in damage to the 
cask, but that large amounts of radiation would not be released (NAS, 2005).  
Finding 3A: Waste stored in fuel pools is more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than fuel 
stored in dry cask units. 
 
 Some individuals interviewed felt that dry casks were sufficient for secure waste storage, 
and encouraged waste in fuel pools to be moved to dry cask storage immediately; to reduce the 
overall security risk of operating power plants. These individuals felt that waste stored in fuel 
pools was much more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than fuel stored in dry cask units, and that 
dry cask storage was the only available storage method that was acceptably secure for storing 
spent nuclear fuel for interim time frames.  
 This finding is supported by The National Academy of Sciences report on the safety and 
security of spent nuclear fuel released in 2004, which suggests that plant-specific vulnerability 
analyses carried out by the NRC might determine that earlier movements of spent fuel from fuel 
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pools to dry casks might reduce the potential consequences of a terrorist attack (NAS, 2005). 
However, the NRC still maintains that fuel pool storage of spent nuclear fuel is sufficiently safe 
(Ward, 2003). 
Finding 3B: Some individuals call for hardened on-site storage to increase the security of 
spent fuel to acceptable levels. 
 
Other individuals thought that the casks were secure, but wanted storage facilities 
hardened, via earthen berms or protective bunkers, to increase the security against planned 
attacks. Hardened storage is a form of nuclear waste storage which is intended to be safer and 
more secure than traditional interim storage options, which leave dry casks exposed to view.  
While dry casks are very secure and robust, and can absorb large impacts without rupturing, they 
may not be capable of withstanding a determined, concentrated attack (Thompson, 2003).  These 
casks may be hardened by surrounding them with layers of concrete, steel, gravel and other 
materials which make them even more durable.  Hardened storage casks are more likely than 
traditional dry casks to withstand a highly focused attack such as an anti-tank missile 
(Thompson, 2003). 
The individuals interviewed did not state that hardened onsite storage was imperative, but 
did want to see facilities hardened to remove the casks from sight in order to increase security. A 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission member that was interviewed stated that dry cask units were 
sufficiently safe and that hardened onsite storage was useful for removing line of sight from 
threats, but was not a necessary security measure. 
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D. Public participation in decision making about on-site interim storage 
 
The process of ISFSI licensing is not very open to public concerns. The public is only 
guaranteed one opportunity to comment on the ISFSI and its location. This opportunity is called 
the notice of availability for public comments, and comes after the submission of the 
Environmental Assessment and the Finding of No Significant Impact (USNRC, May 2007). 
These comments can be mailed to the USNRC, but do not require action. If no significant issues 
are found, either with the location of the ISFSI or the casks to be used, in the five to six months 
following the release of the EA and FONSI, the dry cask proposal is licensed by the NRC and 
construction can begin (USNRC, May 2007). This process does not require the plant or the NRC 
to allow in person opportunities for comment during or after the licensing. This information 
suggested to our group that many of the individuals interviewed would feel that the public was 
not properly represented in the current system. However, we found that only in about half of the 
interviews this was the case. In the other half of the interviews, the individuals felt that the public 
was represented very well in the current system. 
Finding 4: Views on the level and quality of public involvement in interim storage planning 
and licensing were varied. 
 
 About half of the individuals interviewed stated that the public did not have proper 
opportunities to make comments and ask questions during the process of ISFSI licensing and 
approval. These individuals stated that this lack of involvement frustrated the public, and did not 
take their views into account properly. Some of these individuals stated that the only way to 
ensure their views were considered was to sue the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 One individual stated that the level of public involvement in the issue depended on the 
effort put forth by the local nuclear power plant to open up for public comment.  
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 Other individuals felt that the process was sufficient. Many of these individuals were 
Maine Yankee CAP members, who felt that their committee was able to communicate the proper 
information to the public and bring the proper public concerns to the attention of the plant. One 
individual interviewed felt that the public was sufficiently involved, and stated that the NRC was 
putting forth a significant effort to involve the public in this process. 
 
E. Overall Support for Interim Storage 
 
  Some of the individuals interviewed fell within the same demographic group. This 
section seeks to compare the comments of individuals within each demographic; in order to 
determine that group’s overall support for interim storage. 
Finding 5A: Individuals identifying themselves as members of interest groups were among 
the least positive supporters of interim storage. 
 
 The analysis of this demographic group, found in the results chapter, shows that members 
of interest groups raised the most issues about interim storage of nuclear waste. The issues raised 
were primarily social and political ones, and were based around security, cost, and public 
representation.  
Finding 5B: The only issue considered unanimously among individuals identifying 
themselves as members of the government was safety.   
 
 There was very little correlation among the issues that members of the government 
brought up about dry cask storage. The analysis of this demographic group can be found in Table 
5, which clearly shows that the members of the government were only able to agree that dry cask 
storage units are safe. This level of disagreement shows that even within the government there 
are varied views about the issues related to dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel. 
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Finding 5C: Members of the general public that were interviewed in this report felt that 
the public was properly represented in the ISFSI licensing process. 
 
 The members of the general public interviewed in this report felt that they, and the other 
members of their demographic group, were properly represented in the current licensing system. 
This is an unexpected finding because about half of the individuals interviewed felt that the 
general public was not properly represented in the current system. This result may be an artifact 
of interviewing only two members of the public in this project.  
Finding 5D: Plant representatives were most concerned with finding a long-term solution 
to the waste storage issue. 
 
 The plant representatives interviewed were both very knowledgeable about interim 
storage of nuclear waste. This finding is interesting, because these individuals, who had large 
amounts of knowledge about dry casks, were very concerned with bringing waste to a more long 
term solution. This finding, like the last, may be an artifact of interviewing only two members of 
the public in this project.  
Finding 5E: Individuals involved in the Maine Yankee CAP were among the most positive 
supporters of dry cask storage. 
 
 The Maine Yankee CAP demographic was analyzed in the results section of this report 
and showed that CAP members were among the most positive supporters of interim storage of 
nuclear waste in dry casks. Four individuals were interviewed from the Maine Yankee CAP, they 
felt that the casks were sufficient for their purpose, and raised very few concerns. 
 
F. Reprocessing 
 Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is currently an issue of national debate. The early 
interviews conducted by the group did not ask questions about reprocessing, therefore, only three 
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of the individuals interviewed commented on the issue of reprocessing. All three of these 
individuals suggested that they would, now or in the future, like nuclear waste to be reprocessed, 
in order to make the best use of the radioactive plutonium inside. The background information 
gathered in this report suggests that it would not be possible to begin reprocessing waste in the 
United States. This is because the product obtained from the reprocessing is not only useful for 
nuclear fuel, but also for making nuclear weapons (Andrews, 2006). This weapons grade 
material was, as stated in the background, limited by the government in order to restrict the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons (Andrews, 2006).  
Finding 6: Reprocessing of nuclear waste is an issue of debate that should not be linked to 
dry cask storage of nuclear waste. 
 An individual interviewed suggested that nuclear waste should be stored in dry casks for 
interim time periods, because he felt that reprocessing technology would advance in the next few 
decades to safe and acceptable levels, at which time the waste could be retrieved from the casks 
and reprocessed. This idea is refuted by the background material gathered in this report. This is 
because the nuclear isotopes extracted by the reprocessing are weapons grade (Andrews, 2006). 
The United States policy, since the end of the Cold War, has been to limit the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons (Andrews, 2006).  
Also, these issues should not be linked because, even if policy did allow fuel to be 
reprocessed, the need for dry cask storage would not be eliminated. Dry casks would still be 
needed to store the spent nuclear fuel that could no longer be contained in fuel pools at operating 
plants, until a reprocessing plant is available to reprocess it. Also, dry casks would be needed to 
transport the spent nuclear fuel to the reprocessing plant. These points seem to suggest that 
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supporting dry casks on the issue that they might aid the reprocessing of fuel is not a valid reason 
to support interim storage.  
 
G. Issues Associated with Regional Storage 
 
 Regional Storage refers to ISFSI sites that all the waste in one region would be 
transported to. These sites have advantages and disadvantages which were found in the 
background data and were brought up in the interviews. 
Finding 7: The number of on-site interim storage locations should not affect the ability of 
regulators to carry out proper cask inspections, because of the USNRC inspection 
standards that are in place. 
 Some individuals called for regional storage because they felt it was a better solution to 
the dry cask storage problem. One of these individuals stated that they wanted regional storage 
facilities, because they would lower the risk of regulators overlooking aspects related to safety 
during cask inspections. This individual felt that if many ISFSI sites are open around the country, 
the USNRC have trouble inspecting each site thoroughly, and over time that some sites might 
become neglected. The individual felt that this neglect could increase the safety and security 
risks associated with interim storage. This issue is refuted by the existence of the USNRC, which 
enforces security standards that all sites are required to meet (USNRC, 2004). 
Finding 7B: The equitability of interim storage of nuclear waste at regional facilities is 
questionable.  
Other individuals were against regional storage of nuclear waste. These individuals raised 
the contention that it was not equitable to move waste produced in one area to another. These 
individuals felt that the people who benefitted from the power created from the nuclear plant 
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should also be responsible for bearing the burden of the waste produced. One individual, from 
Utah, stated that since Utah does not produce waste, it is the last place waste should be brought 
to. 
H. Summary 
Analysis of the data collected led to seven categories of findings on the issue of interim 
nuclear waste storage; safety, cost, security, public representation, overall support of interim 
storage, reprocessing, and issues associated with regional storage. These findings help clarify the 
issues at hand. The following section contains policy and further study recommendations based 
on these findings.
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6 Recommendations 
 Two types of recommendations are made in this report. The first type deals with policy 
issues, in an attempt to remedy the most significant concerns about interim storage of nuclear 
waste. The second type of recommendation deals with topics that we would recommend for 
further study on the issue of interim storage of nuclear waste. 
I. Policy Recommendations 
 The recommendations in this section are addressed to actions that we suggest the federal 
government should take or might look into taking concerning dry cask storage of nuclear waste. 
Recommendation: The federal government should consider creating a new tax on power 
generated from nuclear reactors that will go toward an account that will fund interim 
storage of nuclear waste. 
 
 This sort of funding for dry cask storage seems to make more sense than the current 
system; in that the interim waste storage would be paid for while electricity is still being 
produced. This tax would be issued on top of other fees embedded in the cost of nuclear 
generated power and would pay for interim storage casks that will need to be built between now 
and the 2017 expected opening date for Yucca Mountain (United States Senate, 2006). The 
revenue generated would only be used for the erection of dry cask storage units. This type of 
fund might encourage plant owners to build dry cask storage units as soon as their waste is 
cooled. This would keep the waste in fuel pools to minimum levels, which has been suggested as 
a measure that might lower the security risk associated with each individual plant (NAS, 2005).  
Recommendation: The federal government should, if they have not already, formulate a 
plan of action for the scenario of an ISFSI owner bankruptcy. 
 
 A written plan of action would be useful in this case in order for the government to be 
prepared in the event of an ISFSI owner bankruptcy. The possibility of bankruptcy is relevant to 
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the companies involved in this scenario because of the long length of time that the facility could 
be needed. This written plan of action would detail what organization is responsible for keeping 
the site safe and secure and where it will get funding from. 
Recommendation: The federal government should create definite standards for nuclear 
waste storage security. 
 
 If hardened on-site storage is necessary in order for a dry cask to survive security risks, 
such as a large plane crash, then the USNRC should consider the chances of such an attack and 
determine whether hardened on-site storage is necessary. This recommendation comes from the 
fact that none of the plants in the United States are out of the range of aircraft flight, and 
therefore, are not out of the range of terrorist attacks related to crashing planes.  
 
II. Further Study Recommendations 
 The recommendations in this section suggest further areas of study related to dry cask 
storage of nuclear waste. These further areas of study represent gaps that we were unable to 
cover in our report. 
Recommendation: The federal government should investigate the success of the Maine 
Yankee Community Advisory Panel in order to determine the usefulness of such groups in 
helping plant operators to communicate with the public during the decommissioning 
process.  
 
 This recommendation comes from the success of the Maine Yankee CAP. The members 
of this group felt very strongly that they were able to help inform the public about the ISFSI that 
was being set up during the Maine Yankee power plant decommissioning. The community 
advisory panel was able to bridge the gap between the power plant operators and the public in 
the area. The CAP members felt that they were able to increase the public’s level of involvement 
pertaining to the ISFSI facility. Our research suggests that panels like this elsewhere could have 
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the same effect. If this is the case then the NRC might find it useful to help set up/require plants 
to set up these types of panels during the decommissioning process. 
We suggest further research be done to determine the usefulness of groups like the Maine 
Yankee CAP for aiding communication between nuclear power plants going through the 
decommissioning process, and the public surrounding them. This research might survey 
individuals living near the decommissioned Maine Yankee site, and individuals around other 
decommissioned plants that did not have a community advisory panel during decommissioning. 
Determining the usefulness of such a group for communicating with the public in the area would 
be useful information for the NRC if they were considering making these groups commonplace. 
 Setting up groups like the Maine Yankee CAP at other plants undergoing 
decommissioning might help alleviate the public communication issues that were referred to by 
the individuals interviewed in this report. This would benefit the public, in that they would have 
their opinions heard, and the plant, in that they would have a chance to communicate what they 
are doing and the level of safety involved in dry cask storage.   
Recommendation: A more detailed study of regional storage options should be completed. 
Regional storage of nuclear waste is an issue that was not covered in proper depth in this 
report. We suggest that another report might be done solely on regional storage of nuclear waste 
to properly weigh the issues that relate to it. Such issues include: equity, transportation, security, 
safety and cost.  
The issue of equity of regional storage of nuclear waste is questionable, and tough to 
resolve. We feel that further investigation into this issue would be useful to determine the facts 
behind the arguments brought up. Such facts might include: the amount of revenue brought in by 
states that would allow private fuel storage, the amount of space taken up by such a facility, and 
the security and safety risks imposed on public surrounding the facility.  
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Recommendation: A further study should investigate how members of the public from 
various locations feel they are represented in the ISFSI licensing process. 
 
 Finding 5C in this report stated that the members of the public interviewed felt that the 
general public as a demographic group was properly represented in the ISFSI licensing process. 
This is interesting because many of the other individuals interviewed felt that the general public 
was not represented properly. We recommend that another report might be done with a larger 
sample of individuals who identify themselves as members of the general public. This report 
might be useful for determining how the public feels that they are represented in the ISFSI 
licensing procedure. 
Recommendation: A further study should interview more plant representatives in order to 
determine their thoughts on dry cask storage for an interim time frame. 
 
 Our sample group found that plant representatives were concerned with finding a long 
term solution to the nuclear waste storage problem. We recommend a further study that takes 
into account the views of a large number of plant representatives from different plants across the 
United States. This larger sample group might be useful in determining the thoughts these 
individuals have on long term solutions to nuclear waste storage.  
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7 Conclusions 
The goal of this project was to determine what social issues are intertwined with the issue 
of interim storage of nuclear waste. Information was gathered from various sources: government 
websites, independent reports, and interviews with individuals from the government, the public, 
interest groups, and plant representatives/consultants. From the information gathered we 
generated fifteen findings. 
Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 This report presents findings in seven categories: safety, cost, security, public 
representation, overall support of interim storage, reprocessing, and issues associated with 
regional storage. Recommendations were made based upon these findings on the issues of 
security, public representation, and cost. 
 The first finding was that safety was not a major issue of concern for the individuals 
interviewed. This finding is backed up by the information gathered during the report writing 
process, which stated that dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel is sufficiently safe for shielding 
heat and radiation from the external environment. 
 The second set of findings was that people are concerned about who will pay for the dry 
cask storage unit and that the companies that own the ISFSI sites might be outlived by the waste 
storage site. To address the first finding we recommended that the federal government might 
consider creating a tax on nuclear power that goes toward an account that will fund interim 
storage of nuclear waste. This type of tax ensures that the waste storage is paid for while the 
electricity is being produced, thus making sure that the individuals that benefit from the power 
pay for the disposal of the waste. To address the second finding we recommended that the 
government should create a plan of action pertaining to the situation of bankruptcy of a plant 
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owner. Having this plan of action ready would ensure that the waste will be taken care of 
properly in the event of a sudden plant owner bankruptcy. 
 The third set of findings pertained to the issue of security. The first finding stated that the 
necessary level of security for dry casks was an issue of debate. The second finding was related 
to the first and stated that some individuals feel that fuel pools are less secure than dry casks, and 
that waste should be moved from fuel pools to dry casks as soon as it is cooled. The third finding 
was also related to the first, and stated that some individuals feel that hardening dry cask 
locations is the best way to ensure that the waste is properly secure. Our recommendation on this 
topic was that the federal government should create definite standards on how waste should be 
stored to maximize security.  
 The fourth finding was that the level of perceived public involvement was variable 
among our sample of interviewees. We noted that the Maine Yankee CAP members were the 
most confident in the representation of the public in their area. Therefore, we recommended that 
the federal government might investigate this success and determine the usefulness of such 
groups. If these groups are found to be useful, the federal government might set up groups of this 
nature at other plants or require other plants to set up said groups. 
 The fifth set of findings pertained to the overall support different demographic groups 
had for interim storage. The demographic groups analyzed were: members of interest groups, 
members of the government, members of the public, plant representatives, and the Maine Yankee 
CAP. We found that the members of interest groups were the least positive supporters of interim 
storage. Members of the government were not able to agree on any of the issues presented except 
for security. Members of the public felt that the public was well represented in the current ISFSI 
licensing process. Plant representatives wanted to see long term storage options become 
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available. Maine Yankee CAP members were the demographic group interviewed with the most 
positive views on the topic of dry cask storage. We recommended a future study be done with a 
larger sample group of the public, asking about their opinions on the level of public involvement 
in ISFSI licensing. We recommended future studies be done with larger sample groups of plant 
representatives as well, particularly asking these individuals how they felt about long term 
nuclear waste storage methods. 
 The sixth finding had to do with reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. We found that the 
issues of reprocessing and interim storage should not be linked. This is because the political 
issues at the heart of the reprocessing dilemma have nothing to do with interim storage of nuclear 
waste. Specifically, storing the waste for a few years in casks will not open an opportunity for 
reprocessing, by allowing the technology time to develop, because the radioisotopes extracted 
from spent nuclear fuel are weapons grade, production of which is against United States policy. 
 The seventh set of findings had to do with the issue of regional storage. We found that the 
argument that regional storage would decrease the chance of regulators overlooking aspects 
related to safety during cask inspections was not valid. We also found that the equity of regional 
storage facilities was questionable. We recommended that further research be done focusing on 
the issue of regional storage. We also recommended that further research be done focusing on 
weighing the facts surrounding the equity of regional storage.  
Report Summary 
 This report considered the social issues associated with interim storage of spent nuclear 
fuel. It identified which issues were most important and validated these issues. Interim storage 
issues are important to consider because spent nuclear fuel is a long lasting material, and 
currently has no final resting place. The issues involved with storing the waste until a final 
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solution can be found, must be resolved in order to avoid problems such as fuel pools filled to 
levels that are not secure. At the same time, we must continue to consider the things that are 
important to us. Rushing to solve this problem is not the solution, we must work together to find 
out which solutions are the safest, most secure, most cost effective, and most fair.
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